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Ramirez: Unequal Treatment of U.S. Citizens

COMMENT

UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF
UNITED STATES CITIZENS:
ERODING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
SAFEGUARDS
INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, at 8:45 a.m. America witnessed a
hijacked airplane flying into the North Tower of the World
Trade Center in New York. 1 While the building caught on fire
and cries echoed into the streets, another plane crashed into
the South Tower of the World Trade Center.2 Forty minutes
later, a third plane crashed into the Pentagon. 3 Five minutes
after the South Tower collapsed, a fourth plane crashed into
rural Pennsylvania. 4 This horrific day ended the lives of
thousands of people. 5
President, George W. Bush, addressing the nation said,
"terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest
buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America."6
The President's address referred to the democracy and
freedoms Americans enjoy. 7 Yet many Americans disagree
with the President's address. The government's action postSeptember 11th may have altered the democracy and freedoms

1 CNN .com.lU. S. Chronology of terror, available at
http://www.cnn.coml2001IUS/09/111chronology.attack (Sept. 12, 2002).
2 Id.
ald.
4 Id.
5 White House Official Site, Statement by the President In His Address to the
Nation, available at http://www.whitehouse.goV/news/releases/2001l09/2001091l16.html(Sept.11. 2001).
6 Id.
7 Id.
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guaranteed to citizens by the United States Constitution
(hereinafter, "Constitution"). The constitutional safeguards,
which lay the foundation for the democracy and freedoms
Americans are guaranteed,8 may be eroding. Subsequent
actions taken by the United States government after the
September 11th attacks, aimed at protecting the United States,
raise constitutional issues. 9 Citizens are detained in military
custody without being charged with crimes, incommunicado,
and without access to counsel. According to Golden Gate
University School of Law's Dean Peter Keane, "the most
disturbing and the most dangerous result of last year's attack
is the outrageous use of those tragic deaths by our government
to drastically alter our democracy and brutalize our
freedoms."lo
Two United States citizens Jose Padilla (aka Abdullah AI
Muhajir) (hereinafter, "Padilla") and Yesser Hamdi
(hereinafter, "Hamdi") were labeled enemy combatants by
President Bush, for alleged acts of terrorism connected with
the September 11, 2001 attacks.l1 The government contends
Padilla is a close associate of al Qaeda and participated in the
planning of future terrorist acts against the United States. 12 In
8 Id.
This author is referring to the rights guaranteed to the United States
Citizens under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See id. The Sixth Amendment provides each citizen with a right to
counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Fourteenth Amendment provides no citizen shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process under the law. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV.
9 ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, Preliminary Report at 2·4,
available at http://www.abanet.orglleadership/enemy_combatants.pdf (Aug. 8, 2002).
10 Interview with Peter G. Keane, Dean, Golden Gate University School of Law, in
San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 9, 2002). Peter G. Keane was appointed in 1999 as Dean of
Golden Gate University School of Law. His appointment follows a twenty·year career
as Chief Assistant Public Defender of San Francisco. Id. In addition, he was in the
private practice of law from 1968·1979. Id. Dean Keane is a former President of the
Bar Association of San Francisco and a former Vice President of the State Bar of
California. Id. He has appeared on The CBS Evening News, CNN, BBC, ABC World
News, Larry King Live, Nightline, Burden of Proof, MSNBC InterNight, and other
news programs throughout the world. Id.
11
Resp't Resp. Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 12·13, 15,
Padilla v. Bush (Aug. 27, 2002) citing Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 296 F.3d 279, 281 (2002),
available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush82702grsp.pdf.
According to the United States government an enemy combatant
[ajrises in the context of foreign relations and national security ... [related toj military·
related judgments in times of active hostilities [for thej protection of Americans .. ,
against unprovoked attack[sj. Id.; See discussion infra Part LD, II.A.
12 Resp't Resp. Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 8, Padilla v.
Bush (Aug. 27, 2002), available
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addition, the government believes Padilla possesses
information that could aid the United States in preventing
future attacks. 13 Similarly the government concluded Hamdi,
based on his background and experience, has considerable
knowledge of the Taliban and al Qaeda training and
operations. 14 The government deems this information as
potentially valuable to the United States security.1 5
Meanwhile, another United States citizen, John Phillip
Walker Lindh, (hereinafter, "Lindh") although not labeled an
enemy combatant, pled guilty in a civilian courtroom to aiding
the Taliban and possessing explosives in the commission of
that crime.1 6 By not labeling Lindh an enemy combatant, he
enjoyed constitutional safeguards denied to Padilla and
Hamdi.1 7 Because Padilla and Hamdi are held as enemy
combatants, they are detained indefinitely without officially
being charged with a crime. Additionally, they are held
incommunicado and without a right to counsel. Depriving
citizens of liberty without due process of the law, as has been
done with both Padilla and Hamdi, raises critical constitutional
concerns.
The purpose of this comment is not to criticize the
government's efforts in apprehending those responsible for the
September 11th terrorist attacks.
Rather, this comment
examines the unequal treatment of United States citizens who
are labeled enemy combatants by looking at the factual and
procedural background of Padilla, Hamdi and Lindh. Next,

http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocslterrorismlpadillabush82702grsp. pdf; AI Qaida also
spelled AI Qaeda is a terrorist group dedicated to opposing non-Islamic governments
with force and violence. Indictment at 2,United States v. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002),
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocsllindhluswlindh020502cmp.html.
13 Resp't Resp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 8, Padilla vs.
Bush (Aug. 27, 2002) citing President Bush's Order (June 9, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlpadillabush82702grsp.pdf.
14 Br. Resp't-Appellants at 9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (June 19, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlhamdirums61902gbrf. pdf. The Taliban is
an extremist form of Islam, which opposes any threat to its form of religion.
Indictment at 3, United States v. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/lindhluswlindh020502cmp.html.
15 Br. Resp't-Appellants at 9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (June 19, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlhamdirums61902gbrf.pdf.
16 Bob Franken and John King, 'I plead guilty,' Taliban American says Plea bargain
precludes possible life sentence (July 2, 2002), CNN.coml Law Center, available at
http://www.cnn.coml20021LAW107/15/walker.lindh. hearing/.
17

Id.
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this comment examines the origins of the label enemy
combatant and the constitutional safeguards afforded to
criminal defendants in similar situations as Padilla, Hamdi,
and Lindh. The terrorist acts Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh are
accused of involve international laws. Therefore, this comment
will examine the Geneva Conventions as a means to
understand humanitarian protections that may cover Padilla
and Hamdi.
Finally, this comment will provide
recommendations for some of the issues raised.
1. BACKGROUND

A.

JOSE PADILLA'S FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jose Padilla is a United States citizen by birth. He was
born on October 18, 1970, in Brooklyn, New York.l 8 Padilla
allegedly traveled to Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Mghanistan as a close associate of the al Qaeda network. 19 In
2001 and 2002, Padilla allegedly met with senior al Qaeda
leaders on several occasions. 20 Under the direction of al Qaeda
leaders, Padilla received training embodying the wiring of
explosive devices. 21 According to the United States government,
the training encompassed terrorist operations targeting the
United States. 22 These plans subsumed a scheme to detonate
explosives devices in hotel rooms and gas stations and a
"radiological dispersal device" (dirty bomb) within the United
States. 23 The United States government alleges Padilla, under
the guidance of al Qaeda leaders, explored and advanced
further terrorist attacks against the United States. 24 The
government argued that multiple intelligence sources
confirmed Padilla's involvement in planning future terrorist
attacks by al Qaeda. 25 President Bush recounted Padilla's

18 Jonathan Weisman, Debbie Howlett and Dave Moniz, American terror suspect is
not
unique,
USA
TODAY
(June
11,
2002),
available
at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nationl2002/06/11/suspect-usat.htm.
19 See supra note 11 at 7.
20

21
22
23
24

25

[d.
[d.

[d.
[d. at 7-8.
[d.
[d. at 8.
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involvement and ordered his detention as an enemy combatant
as follows:
Padilla is closely associated with al Qaeda; that he has
engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts,
including conduct in preparation for acts of international
terrorism that had the aim to cause injury to or adverse
effects on the United States; that he possesses intelligence,
including intelligence about personnel and activities of al
Qaeda that, if communicated to the U.S., would aid U.S.
efforts to prevent attacks by al Qaeda; that he represents a
continuing present and grave danger to the national security
of the United States; and that his detention as an enemy
combatant is necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda
in its efforts to attack the United States or its armed forces,
other governmental personnel, or citizens. 26

Padilla was arrested on May 8, 2002, at O'Hare
International Airport, just outside of Chicago, Illinois,
pursuant to a material witness warrant related to grand jury
proceedings in the Southern District of New York (hereinafter,
"SDNY").27
Padilla was detained at the Metropolitan
Correctional Center in New York. 28 On May 15, 2002, the
Honorable Chief Judge Michael B. Mukasey assigned him
defense counsel, Donna R. Newman. 29 On June 9, 2002,
President Bush determined Padilla was an enemy combatant
and thus transferred him to the custody of the United States
military. 30 On that same day, without informing defense
counsel Newman, the Department of Justice requested that the
SDNY vacate the material witness warrant. 3!
The
32
government's request was granted.
[d. citing President Bush's Order (June 9, 2002).
Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4·5, Padilla vs. Bush (June
26, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush62602gmot.pdf; Pet'r Reply
Mot. Dismiss Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4, Padilla v. Bush (July 12, 2002),
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush71202reply.pdf.
28 Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Padilla vs. Bush (June
26, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorism/padillabush62602gmot.pdf.
29 Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2, Padilla v. Bush (June 19, 2002),
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorism/padillabush61902apet.pdf.
30 See supra note 28.
31 Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Padilla v. Bush (June 26,
2002), available
26

27
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Now under the exclusive control of the United States
military, Padilla was transported to the Consolidated Naval
Brig in Charleston, South Carolina for detention and
questioning. 33 On June 11, 2002, after the material witness
warrant was vacated, Newman, as next friend of Jose Padilla,
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 34 The writ was
amended on June 19, 2002.35 The amended petition of habeas
corpus raises the three following claims challenging Padilla's
detention: Padilla's detention violates the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution; the
Presidential Order under which Padilla is detained violates
Article I of the United States Constitution; Padilla's detention
in military custody is unlawful because the civilian courts are
open and no martial law exists. 36
On June 26, 2002, the government filed a motion to
dismiss the amended petition of habeas corpus. 37
The
government contends Newman lacks standing as next friend to
bring the habeas corpus petition on behalf of Padilla. 38
Further, the government argues President Bush, Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, and Attorney General Ashcroft are improper
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlpadillabush62602gmot.pdf; Pet'r Reply
Mot. Dismiss Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Padilla v. Bush (July 12, 2002),
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorism/padillabush71202reply.pdf.
32 See supra note 28.
33 Id.
34 Pet'r Reply Mot. Dismiss Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Padilla v. Bush
(July 12, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush71202reply. pdf.
A writ of
habeas corpus is available to every person who claims to be unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained. United States v. Commanding Officer, Armed Forces, 403. F.2d 371 (1968).
28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2002) requires a writ of habeas corpus to be in writing, signed, and
verified by the person whose relief is sought or by someone acting in his behalf. Id.
Since Padilla is held incommunicado and without access to counsel, Donna Newman
filed the writ of habeas corpus as next friend of Padilla. See supra note 29. The two
requirements for a petition as next friend are set out in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 163-164 (1990). First, there must be an explanation outlining why the party
for whom the relief is sought cannot sign and verify the writ. Id. Second, the next
friend must be truly dedicated to the best interest of the person for whom relief is
sought and a significant relationship between the real party in interest must exist. Id.
35 See supra note 29 at 10.
36 See supra note 11at 9-lD. Martial law is the will of the commanding officer. Ex
Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 35 (1866). The notion that in certain cases a proclamation by
a commanding officer supplants civil law is erroneous. Id.
37 Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla vs. Bush (June 26,
2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush62602gmot.pdf.
38 Id. at 6-10.
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respondents for the habeas corpus. 39 Rather, Padilla's proper
custodian is Commander M.A. Mar, the officer in charge of the
brig where he is detained. 40 The government further suggests
the SDNY lacks territorial jurisdiction over the brig where
Padilla is detained. 41 On July 12, 2002, Newman filed a reply
to the government's motion to dismiss arguing she possesses
the proper standing as next friend to bring the habeas petition
on Padilla's behalf.42 Newman maintains the SDNY has
jurisdiction over the petition because the proper custodian is
not the jailer. 43 The reply states that Commander Marr is not
authorized to deliver Padilla's body.44 Therefore, the proper
respondents are President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld. 45
In addition to Padilla's reply to the government's motion to
dismiss, the New York State Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (hereinafter, "NYSACDL") and the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (hereinafter,
"NACDL") filed an amici curiae brief in the SDNY to inform the
court of those issues NYSACDL and NACDL identified as
critical to Padilla's case. 46 These issues include: the court's
subject matter and in personam jurisdiction over Padilla's case;
Ms. Newman's proper status as "next friend"; President Bush
and Secretary Rumsfeld status as proper respondents;
Commander Marr's lack of authority as proper respondent;
Padilla's illegal detention arising out of the denial of his
Constitutional right to legal counsel and to communicate freely
with an attorney; the court's ability to review Padilla's cases;
Padilla's entitlement to "prisoner of war" status or in the
alternative, a hearing as prescribed by the Geneva Conventions
if viewed as an enemy combatant. 47 On September 27, 2002,
amici submitted a supplemental brief seeking to clarify its

[d. at 10-16.
[d. at 16-20.
41
[d.
42 Pet'r Reply Mot. Dismiss Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6-11, Padilla v. Bush
(July 12, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlpadillabush71202reply.pdf.
43
[d. at 11-15.
44 [d. at 21-24.
45 [d. at 15-21.
46 Br. Amici Curiae, Padilla v. Bush (July 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush702ambrf.pdf.
47 [d.
39
40
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position in its initial brief. 48 The sole issue amici identified in
Padilla's case is his continued unlawful incommunicado
detention in military custody as a civilian. 49
On August 27,2002, the government submitted a response
and a motion to dismiss the amended petition for writ of
habeas corpus asserting the lawfulness of Padilla's detention. 50
The government maintains that the President's June 9, 2002,
order and the sworn declaration from Michael Mobbs, Special
Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense For Policy, satisfy
the judicial review for determining the lawfulness of Padilla's
detention. 51 In Mobbs' unclassified declaration, he claims
involvement with matters relating to the detention of enemy
combatants. 52
In addition, Mobbs declaration states he
examined governmental records and reports relevant to
Padilla's case and the President's June 9, 2002 order that was
based on multiple intelligence sources. 53 However, the records,
reports and the intelligence sources used for Mobbs' declaration
are not cited. 54
The government submitted a reply in support of its motion
to dismiss the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
October 11, 2002.55 The government maintains that American
jurisprudence allows the military to detain enemy combatants
in absence of an official declaration of war.56 In addition, the
government argues that Congress supported the President's

48 Supplemental Br. Amici Curiae at 1, Padilla v. Bush (Sept. 27, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush92702ambrf.pdf.
49 Id. Amici contends that the government's arguments failed in the following four
ways: an extra-constitutional status is imposed on a citizen with the label enemy
combatant; the United States is legally at war; even in the absence of martial law the
American history supports the detention of citizens in military custody; the
Commander in Chief warrants complete judicial deference. Id. at Part IV.
60 Resp't Resp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10-20, Padilla
vs. Bush (Aug. 27, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/padillabush92702ambrf.pdf.
51 See supra note 11 at 15.
52 Unclassified Decl. Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy at 1, Padilla v. Bush (Aug. 27, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush82702mobbs.pdf.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 1-6.
55 Resp't Reply In Supp. Mot. Dismiss Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Padilla
v. Bush (Oct. 11, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabushl 0 1102grply. pdf.
56
Id. at Part I, Subpart A.
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action.57 The government further argues the President's
determination that Padilla is an enemy combatant is entitled
to deferential treatment by the courts. 58
The SDNY ordered the petitioner and respondents to
submit additional briefing addressing Padilla's right to counsel
and the propriety of Mobbs' declaration in camera and ex parte
on· October 21, 2002. 59 Seven days after the order, the
government submitted its response arguing that Padilla has no
right to counsel because he is an enemy combatant. 6o The
government asserts the purpose of Padilla's detention is
twofold. 61 First, his detention prevents him from aiding the
enemy in executing attacks against the United States. 62
Second, his detention assists the United States military in
gathering information necessary to carry out the war.63 The
government contends the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
not triggered until the criminal prosecution against Padilla is
initiated. 64
Further, the government contends that although the
unclassified version of Mobbs' declaration alone establishes the
proper determination of Padilla's status as an enemy
combatant, the SDNY may consider Mobbs' classified
declaration in camera and ex parte. 65
The government
maintains the classified version of Mobbs' declaration contains
confidential intelligence materials. 66
Moreover, the
government argues that due to the ongoing armed conflict, the
intelligence materials contained in the declaration are
compelling reasons to keep Mobbs' classified declaration in
camera and ex parte. 67

Id. at Part I, Subpart B.
Id. at Part II.
59 Resp't Response This Ct.'s October 21, 2002 Order at 1, Padilla v. Bush (Oct. 28,
2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabushl02802grsp.pdf.
60 Id.
6! Id.
62 Id. at 1-2.
63 Id.
64
Id. at 3.
65 Id. at 15.
66 Id. at 15-21.
67 Id. at 19.
57

58
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On December 4, 2002, the SDNY delivered an opinion and
order. 68 The SDNY denied the government's motion to dismiss
the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus for Newman's
lack of standing as next friend of Padilla. 69 The court held the
proper respondent in Padilla's case is Secretary Rumsfeld. 70
The court further disclosed that it possesses the proper
jurisdiction over the case and Secretary Rumsfeld. 71 The
SDNY, however, found the President has the constitutional
68 Op. Order, Padilla v. Bush (Dec. 4, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush1204020pn.pdf.
69
Id. at 24. The government contends Newman lacks the significant relationship
required by next friend and cites Hamdi as authority. Id. at 18. The SDNY found that
Newman was not an intruder or uninvited meddler posing as next of friend. Id. at 20.
In fact, Newman consulted with Padilla as his defense counsel during the material
witness proceedings. Id. at 19-20. In addition, Newman consulted with Padilla's family
in her role as attorney. Id. at 20. Therefore, the SDNY found that Newman was the
one person aware of Padilla's wishes and the person best equipped to achieve them. Id.
The SDNY noted the legal issues between the material witness and habeas corpus
proceedings are different. Id. The relationship, however, between Newman and Padilla
has not changed. Id. Therefore, the SDNY held that Newman has standing to pursue
Padilla's petition as next friend. Id. at 24.
70 See supra note 68 at 24. The SDNY found the proper respondent for the writ of
habeas corpus was Secretary Rumsfeld because of his personal involvement in Padilla's
case. Id. at 32. The President's June 9, 2002 order, charged Secretary Rumsfeld with
Padilla's detention. Id. He sent the Department of Defense personnel to take custody
of Padilla. Id. Secretary Rumsfeld or his designee determined and sent Padilla to the
brig in South Carolina. Id. Finally, Secretary Rumsfeld decides what information is
releasable or filtered from Padilla and determines when the danger Padilla poses has
passed. Id. Since Secretary Rumsfeld was the proper respondent, the SDNY found it
unnecessary to reach a decision determining whether President Bush was the proper
respondent in Padilla's case. Id. at 33. A second reason the court dismissed the
President as a respondent is based on the relief Padilla seeks. Id. Padilla is not
directly seeking relief from the President. Id. Based on the two above-mentioned
reasons, President Bush was dismissed as a party to the case. Id. at 34. Similarly,
Commander Mar was also dismissed because Secretary Rumsfeld, as proper
respondent, could order him to comply with an order. Id. at 35-36. Thus, the court
denied the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or in the alternative
transfer of Padilla's case to South Carolina. Id. at 3.
71
See supra note 68 at 3. The court citing Title 18 of the United States Code
Section 2241(a) held there was jurisdiction over Padilla's habeas corpus petition if it
was authorized under New York's long arm statute. Id. at 44. New York's long arm
statute permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over cases for non-resident that
transact business in person or through an agent within the state. Id. at 45. The
statute defines a business broadly and does not limit commercial transactions. Id. at
45. Under New York's long arm statute, the SDNY found personal jurisdiction over
Secretary Rumsfeld. Id. The court further denied the government's motion to transfer
Padilla's case to South Carolina because the issues pertaining to the proper respondent
and jurisdiction favored keeping the case in the SDNY. Id. at 46-47. The court also
cited case law that suggested taking into consideration the convenience and
practicality of the parties. Id. Therefore, the court found that those considerations
supported keeping the case in the SDNY. Id.
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authority to detain Padilla.72 Therefore, Padilla's detention is
not per se unlawful. 73 The court further held that Padilla may
consult with counsel in matters aiding the habeas corpus
petition. 74 The SDNY determined Padilla's status as an enemy
combatant, is subject to the judicial review standard of some
evidence. 75 In addition, the SDNY will not use Mobbs' sealed
declaration to determine whether the government has met the
standard of some evidence. 76 The SDNY ordered both parties
72 See supra note 68 at 46-52.
The SDNY held that it was unnecessary for a
congressional declaration of war to occur in order for the President to exercise his
power in an armed conflict. Id. at 50. The SDNY citing the Prize cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635 (1862), found that the United States Supreme Court recognized a war
without a declaration of war. Id. The court further reasoned that even if Congressional
authorization were necessary, the joint resolution passed on September 14, 2001,
fulfilled that requirement. Id. at 53. The court rationalized that the President's June
9, 2002, order simply labeled Padilla an enemy combatant. Id. at 60-61. An enemy
combatant is analogous to an unlawful combatant who is not subject to the protections
of the Geneva Conventions. Id. The SDNY citing United States u. Lindh found the
Taliban militia unqualified for lawful combatant status. Id. at 60. Therefore the SDNY
held that the President's authority to order the detention of unlawful enemy
combatants arises under the joint resolution and from his status as Commander-inChief. Id. at 66.
73
See supra note 68 at 3. In concluding Padilla's detention is not per se unlawful,
the SDNY reasoned that the case falls within the exception of Title 18 of the United
States Code Section 4001. Id. at 68-69. The court found that Padilla is in fact detained
pursuant to an "Act of Congress," the joint resolution. Id. The SDNY further noted the
joint resolution qualified as an act of Congress. Id. at 72. The court held that Title 18
of the United States Code Section 4001(a) does not bar Padilla's detention. Id. at 74.
Furthermore, the court held that Padilla detention is not barred as a matter oflaw. Id.
74 See supra note 68 at 75. The SDNY held that Padilla has a right to present facts.
Id at 75-76. This right is firmly rooted in the following statutes: Title 28 of the United
States Code Section 2241; Title 28 of the United States Code Section 2243; Title 28 of
the United States Code Section 2246, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures; Rules
Governing Section 2254; Title 18 of the United States Code Section 3006(a)(2)(B). Id. at
75-77. The court determined that the most convenient and useful vehicle for Padilla to
present facts is through counsel. Id. at 75. The court, however, noted that Padilla has
no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
absent criminal proceeding. Id. at 77-78.
75 See supra note 68 at 96-97.
The SDNY will examine evidence supporting the
President's June 9, 2002, order determining Padilla an enemy combatant by the
standard of "some evidence." Id. The court cited the deference treatment the Supreme
Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States u. Hamdi grant to the
President's constitutional authority. Id. at 93-96. In addition, the court will examine
whether that evidence is mooted by subsequent actions or events to Padilla's detention.
Id. at 96. Specifically, the SDNY will look for "some evidence" suggesting that the
government's papers support Padilla's hostile status. Id. at 97.
76 See supra note 68 at 90. The SDNY found the sealed Mobbs' declaration did not
broaden the nature of the accusations against Padilla compared to the unsealed Mobbs
The sealed Mobbs declaration sets forth objective
declaration. Id. at 100.
circumstantial evidence collaborating factual allegations set out in the sealed Mobbs
declaration. Id. Mter Padilla has the opportunity to contest the unsealed Mobbs
declaration and if the SDNY finds the government failed to meet the "some evidence"
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to discuss and arrange conditions for Newman's consultation
with Padilla. 77 The SDNY further scheduled the parties for a
conference on December 30, 2002, to report the results of those
discussions and arrangements and to schedule further
proceedings.78

B. YESSER HAMDI'S FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Yesser Hamdi is a United States citizen by birth.79 He was
born on September 26, 1980, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 80 In
response to the al Qaeda terrorist network attack on the
United States on September 11, 2001, the President ordered
the United State s armed forces to apprehend al Qaeda and
Taliban members.81 During this ongoing military operation,
the United States Armed Forces captured Hamdi. 82 He was
initially detained at Camp X-Ray at the Naval Base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 83 When it came to light that he was
born in Louisiana, and may be an American citizen, Hamdi was
transported to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig. 84 Allegedly,
Hamdi possesses considerable knowledge about the Taliban
and the al Qaeda network. 85 Particularly his knowledge
pertaining to their training and operations is potentially
valuable information to the United States. 86 Therefore, the
United States determined Hamdi's continued detention as an
enemy combatant comports with the laws and customs of war.87
On May 10, 2002, the Federal Public Defender for the
Eastern District of Virginia, Frank Dunham filed a writ of
habeas corpus as next friend of Hamdi. 88 On May 29, 2002, the
district court granted the writ of habeas corpus and allowed
test, the admission of the sealed Mobbs declaration will be reevaluated. Id. at 101.
. 77
See supra note 68 at 102.
78 Id.
79 Yesser Hamdi, Birth Certificate, available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlhamdi92680birthc. pdf. (last visited Feb.
25,2003).
80 Id.
8!
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598,601 (2002).
82
Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See supra note 15 at 9.
86 Id.
87 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d at 601.
88 Id. at 600·601.
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Hamdi unmonitored access to the public defender.89 The
government filed a motion for stay in the court of appeals. 90
While these proceedings were pending, Esam Fouad Hamdi,
Hamdi's father, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus as
next friend. 91 On June 11, 2002, the district court concluded
that Hamdi's father properly filed his case as next friend. 92
The Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of
Virginia was appointed as counsel for the petitioners, and the
court ordered the government to allow the public defender
unmonitored access to Hamdi. 93 On July 12, 2002, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's June
11 th order mandating access to counsel and remanded the case
for further proceedings because it appointed counsel and
ordered access to the detainee without adequately considering
the implications of its actions and before allowing the United
States even to respond. 94 On June 14, 2002, the government's
motion to stay the proceedings connected with Hamdi was
granted by the Fourth District Court of Appeals. 95
On July 31, 2002, the district court for the Eastern District
of Virginia ordered the government to produce numerous
materials that were redacted to protect intelligence
information for in camera review. 96 The court's production
order requested sua sponte copies of all statements made by
enemy combatants, notes taken from any interviews with
enemy combatants, contact information on anyone who
interrogated enemy combatants, copies of all statements made
by the Northern Alliance concerning enemy combatants, and
chronology of the detention of the enemy combatants while in
military control. 97 The district court further ordered the
89

[d. at 601-602.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (2002).
[d.
92 [d.
93 [d.
94 [d. at 284.
95 Order at 1-2, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Aug. 7, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorism/hamdirums080702ord.pdf.
96 Resp't Mot. Relief From This Ct.'s Prod. Order of July 31, 2002 at 1, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld (Aug. 5, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlhamdirums080502gmot.pdf; Resp't Mem.
In Supp. Mot. Relief from This Ct.'s Prod. Order of July 31, 2002 at 1-3, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld (Aug. 5, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hamdirums080502gmot. pdf.
97 Resp't Mem. In Supp. Mot. Relief from This Ct.'s Prod. Order of July 31, 2002 at
90

91
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government to appear for arguments on August 8, 2002,
pertaining to the information submitted in accordance with its
July 31st production order.98
On August 5, 2002, the government filed a motion for relief
from the district court's July 31st production order, on the
grounds the order produced an insidious burden on the
government. 99
Further, the government contends the
information is not necessary for the resolution of the habeas
corpus petition or respondent's motion to dismiss.1°o On
August 7, 2002, the district court's order issued an order
canceling the hearing scheduled for August 8, 2002, pending
Hamdi's motion to dissolve the stay with the court of
appeals.1 01
On August 8, 2002, the Fourth District Court of Appeals
dissolved its June 14, 2002, stay order.1 02 The court of appeals
furthered directed the district court to resolve the issue of
whether Mobbs' declaration was sufficient, on its own, to detain
Hamdi without being charged, without right to counsel, and
incommunicado. 103 On August 16, 2002, pursuant to the
directions provided by the court of appeals, the district court
examined Mobbs' declaration, read briefs submitted by both
parties, and heard oral arguments on the matter.1 04 The
district court held Mobbs' declaration was insufficient to detain
1-3, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Aug. 5, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlhamdirums080502gmot.pdf.
98 Id. at 1.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 6.
101
See supra note 95.
102 Order at 4-5, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Aug. 16, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlhamdirums81602ord.pdf.
103
Id. at 1-2. Michael H. Mobbs declaration was attached to the Respondent's brief
submitted on July 25, 2002. Id. at 9. Mobbs' Declaration was a two page long
document, which failed to address critical issues to Hamdi's case. Id. The district
court found the declaration lacked the following: the nature and authority Mobbs
possesses to review and make declarations on behalf of the Executive Branch
determining Hamdi's status; the authority a Special Advisor of Defense for Policy has
for labeling citizens enemy combatants; intelligence information or the gathering of
intelligence information pertaining to Hamdi; information explaining why Hamdi is
treated differently than all other captured Taliban; the authority and the procedures
used to conclude Hamdi's capture was lawful; the authority and the procedures
authorizing Mobbs to supervise the classification of enemy combatants; details
surrounding Hamdi's detention and transfer to military custody. Id. at 9-11. These
questions were further asked during oral arguments and Respondents' counsel was
unable to answer. Id. at 13.
104
Id.
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Hamdi. 105 The government's motion for relief from the district
court's production order on July 31st filed on August 5, 2002,
was denied. 106 The court ordered the government to comply
with its July 31st production order by August 21,2002. 107
On August 19, 2002, the government filed a motion for
certification of interlocutory appeal and stay claiming the
district court's August 16, 2002, holding implicates an
important question of deferential treatment owed to military
and
requires
sensitive
national
security
decisions
l08
information.
The government contends the August 16, 2002,
order involves a controlling issue of law, which will determine
the outcome of the case. 109 In addition, the government
requests a stay of Hamdi's proceeding while the issue is
resolved. llo
C. JOHN PHILLIP WALKER LINDH'S FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND

John Phillip Walker Lindh is a United States citizen by
birth.lll He was born in February 1981, in Washington, D.C.ll2
Lindh's indictment alleged the following counts:
[C]onspiracy to murder United States Nationals including
civilians and military personnel by committing murder;
conspiracy to provide materials support and resources to
Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) and providing material
support and resources to the HUM; conspiracy to provide
material support and resources to al Qaeda and providing
material support and resources to al Qaeda; conspiracy to
contribute services to al Qaeda and contributing services to al
Id. at 2, 14.
Id. at 2.
107 Id.
108 Resp't Mot. Certification Interlocutory Appeal and Stay at 1, Hamdi v. Rumsfield
(Aug.
19,
2002),
available
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/hamdirums81902gmot.pdf. A court may
certify an interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) if the following criteria is met:
an order involves a controlling question of law; substantial grounds for a difference of
opinion regarding the question of law; an immediate appeal from the order may
determine the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 2.
\09
Id.
110 Id. at 7-8.
111 Profile: John Walker Lindh, (Thursday, Jan. 24, 2002), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilworldlamericaslI779455.stm
112 Id.
105

106
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Qaeda; conspiracy to supply services to the Taliban and
supplying services to the Taliban; using, carrying, and
possessing firearms and destructive devices during violent
crimes. 113

On or about November 25,2001, Lindh surrendered to the
Northern Alliance during an ongoing civil war against the
Taliban. 114 Johnny Spann, a Central Intelligence Agency
employee was conducting interviews of captured Taliban
personnel at the Aala-iJanghi (QIJ) compound near
Mghanistan. 115
Among the individuals interviewed was
Lindh. 116 Shortly after Spann interviewed Lindh, prisoners
staged an uprising, which ultimately ended Spann's life.1 17 The
situation was controlled after several days.118 Lindh was shot
in the leg as he attempted to escape. 1l9 On December 1, 2001,
the Northern Alliance soldiers detained Lindh with the
assistance of United States military personnel.1 20 Mter Lindh
was identified as a United States national, he was given
medical assistance and interrogated. 121

113
Indictment at 6·14, United States u. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh020502cmp.htmI. Harakat ul·
Mujahideen (HUM) is a terrorist group dedicated to Islam's extremist views. Id. at 3.
114
Criminal CompI. at 2, United States v. Lindh (Jan. 15, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/lindhluswlindh11502cmp.htmI.
The Northern
Alliance, which fought to overthrow the Taliban's militia control of Mghanistan, was a
coalition of non-Pashtun groups who opposed the Taliban., Indictment at 3, United
States v. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh020502cmp.htmI. According to
CNN, the United States exchanged and gave information to the Northern Alliance.
Northern Alliance: U.S. strikes accurate, CNN Report available at
http://www.cnn.com/2001fWORLD/asiapcf/centraU10107/ret.ab dullah.attacks.cnnal
(Oct. 7, 2001).
115
Criminal CompI. at 2, United States v. Lindh (Jan. 15,2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh11502cmp.htmI.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at. 10. Pashtun is the ethnic majority in Mghanistan. Indictment at 3,
United States v. Lindh (Feb. 5, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh020502cmp.htmI.
120 Br. Amici Curiae Int'l Human Rights Org. In Supp. of Def.
Mot. Suppress
Involuntary Statements and Evidence at 3, United States u. Lindh (June 18, 2002),
available http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh 71002ammot. pdf.
121 Criminal Com pI. at 2-3, United States u. Lindh (Jan. 15, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluswlindh11502cmp.html.
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On March 15, 2002, the defense filed a motion to compel
production of discovery with the Eastern District of Virginia. 122
The motion moved the court for an order compelling the
government to comply with the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 16(a).123 Lindh sought identifying information for
the following individuals the government claimed as
confidential sources: individuals who participated in his
interrogations; individuals the government redacted from
reports; individuals who wrote documents pertaining to
statements allegedly made by Lindh; individuals who guarded
and maintained contact with Lindh; and all other information
referencing Lindh. 124
On June 17, 2002, Lindh filed a motion to suppress
involuntary statements and evidence.1 25 In support of Lindh's
motion, the International Human Rights Organization filed a
amici curiae brief on July 10, 2002.1 26 This amici consists of
several human rights organizations dedicated to the consistent
application of internationallaws. 127 Amici identified two issues
critical to Lindh's case.1 28 First, they allege the tortures, cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment endured by Lindh while in
the custody of the United States, are prohibited by
internationallaws. 129 Second, they allege statements given by
Lindh, obtained through torture and coercion, are forbidden by
122 Notice Mot. and Mot. Compel Prod. Disc., United States v. Lindh (March 15,
2002), available http;IInews.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh31502discmot.pdf.
123 [d. at 1. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(a) permits the defendant to
obtain relevant written or recorded statements made before or after his or her arrest, if
used at trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a).
124 Notice Mot. and Mot. Compel Prod. Disc. at 2·9, United States v. Lindh (March
15,2001), available http;lInews.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh31502discmot.pdf.
125 Def. Notice and Mot. Suppress Statements on Dec. 1, 2001, U.S. Special Forces
and Robert Felton, United States v. Lindh (June 17, 2002), available
http;IInews.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh61702sfsupmot.pdf.
126 Mot. Leave To File Br. of Amici Curiae and Br. of Amici Curiae Int'l Human
Rights Org. In Supp. Def. Mot. Suppress Involuntary Statements and Evidence, United
States v. Lindh (June 18, 2002), available
http;lInews.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh71002ammot.pdf.
127 [d.
at 1.
The following organizations support Amici; the Center for
Constitutional Rights, the Center for Justice & Accountability, the Extradition and
Human Rights Committee of the American Branch of the International Law
Association, Human Rights Advocates, and World Organization Against Torture USA.
[d. at 1-4.
128 Br. Amici Curiae Int'l Human Rights Org. In Supp. of Def.
Mot. Suppress
Involuntary Statements and Evidence at 5, United States v. Lindh (June 18, 2002),
available http;lInews.findlaw.comlhdocsldocsllindhluslindh71002ammot.pdf.
129 [d.
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international laws.1 30 Amici sought to exclude evidence and
statements obtained through coercion and torture. 131
On July 15, 2002, Lindh and his team of lawyers entered
into a plea agreement with United States Attorneys for the
Eastern District of Virginia by pleading guilty to two crimes. 132
The first crime consisted of supplying services to the Taliban. 133
The second crime consisted of carrying explosives in the course
of supplying services to the Taliban. 134
In conjunction with the plea agreement, both parties
stipulated and agreed to the following facts. On June 30, 2000,
President William J. Clinton declared the nation in state of
emergency because of threats posed by al Qaeda and the
Taliban.1 35 The nation's state of emergency continued with
President's Bush declaration that the Taliban continued to use
Mghanistan as a safe heaven for the operations of Usama bin
Laden and the al Qaeda network. 13G In Mayor June of 2001,
Lindh traveled to Mghanistan with the purpose of assisting the
Taliban in its fight against the Northern Alliance.1 37 During
the same time, Lindh revealed to the Taliban recruiting
personnel that he was an American citizen and wanted to fight
in the front lines. 13B Additionally, Lindh disclosed his desire to
undergo military preparation at a training camp.1 39 Lindh
participated fully in the training activities.1 40 His training
included "weapons, orienteering, navigation, explosives and
battlefield combat."141 Mter completing his training a;nd
Id.
Id. at 28-29. Some of the examples of torture and coercion Lindh endured are
highlighted in Amici's brief. Id. at 3-5. Some of the examples are: Lindh bound,
blindfolded, and handcuffed while in custody; derogatory and threatening statements
including death threats; plastic straps used to bind Lindh's hands which cut into his
skin and cut off his circulation; Lindh was stripped naked and bound to a stretcher;
Lindh was placed in a metal storage container with no windows, and no heat source;
Lindh was provided with minimal food and medical attention. Id.
132 Def. Sentencing Mem. at 3,11, United States v. Lindh (Sept. 26, 2002), available
http://news.findiaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh92602dsenmem.pdf.
133
Id. at II.
134
Id.
135 Statement of Facts, United States v. Lindh (July 15, 2002), available
http://news.findiaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh 71502sof. pdf.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
130

131
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pledging allegiance to jihad, Lindh traveled to the front line in
Takhar, Mghanistan bearing an AKM rifle.1 42
Between
September and November of 2001, Lindh and his fighting
group rotated shifts fighting against the Northern Alliance.1 43
Lindh, knowingly engaging in a commission of a felony, carried
a rifle and grenades. 144
As part of the plea agreement, both parties concurred that
Lindh's sentence would be twenty years in prison.1 45 Defense
counsel, however, requested from the court that Lindh gain
access to a facility with educational opportunities at the
university level as well as one close to his family's residence in
California. 146 Such a request was based on the notion that
Lindh possessed knowledge and intelligence that could assist
the United States in countering future terrorist threats.1 47
Therefore, providing Lindh access to higher education can only
further the United States efforts in countering future terrorist
threats. 148
D. ENEMY COMBATANT

Labeling individuals as enemy combatants originated
during World War II.1 49 On July 2, 1942, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt issued Proclamation No. 2561 (hereinafter,
"Proclamation") demanding that enemies entering the United
States committing sabotage, espionage, or warlike acts be tried
WIthin the laws ofwar.1 50 The proclamation asserted that any
person charged with attempting to commit or committing
sabotage, espionage, or warlike acts, is subject to a military
tribunal and prohibited from seeking remedies from civilian
United States Courts.1 51
The Proclamation cites the

ld.
[d.
144
Id.
145 Plea Agreement, United States v. Lindh (July 15, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.cOmlhdOCS/doCSllindhluSlindh71502Pleaag.Pdf·
146Def.SentenCingMem.at1, United States v. Lindh (Sept. 26, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docsllindhluslindh92602dsenmem.pdf.
147 Id. at 7-8.
148 [d.
149
See supra note 9 citing Ex parte Quirin v. United States, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
150 Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101, and in 56 Stat. 1964 (July 2, 1942).
151 [d.
142

143
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Constitution and United States Statues as authority for
prosecuting individuals before military tribunals. 152
The United States government contends that citizens are
detainable indefinitely upon its "say-so."153 The government
asserts the authority to label citizens as enemy combatants and
cites Ex Parte Quirin for support. 154 In Ex Parte Quirin, the
President Franklin D. Roosevelt acting within his power as
Commander in Chief appointed a military commission to try
the petitioners for "offensives against the law of war and the
Articles of War ... "155 At the time, the United States declared
war against the German Reich. 156 One of the accused claimed
United States citizenship. 157 All of the accused, wearing
German infantry uniforms, emerged from submarines and
entered the United States carrying explosives, flammable
articles and timing devices. 158 Upon coming ashore in the
United States, they discarded their uniforms and embarked on
the execution of their sabotage plans.1 59
They were
60
apprehended before the execution of these plans.1
The United States Supreme Court considered whether the
President acted within his power when he authorized trials by
military commissions. 161 The President, as Commander in
Chief, appointed a Military Commission to try offenses against
the laws of war.162 As Commander in Chief, the President
must carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the
conduct of war.163 The Court explicitly stated that citizenship
was not an issue in the case because the crime violated the
laws of war.1 64 The Court held that the President's July 2,
1942, Proclamation Order was authorized by the
[d.
See supra note 9 at 3; Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283. The government contends that
American citizens "alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained indefinitely
without charges or counsel on the government's say·so." [d.
154
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283.
155 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22.
156
[d. at 21.
157 [d. at 20.
158
[d. at 21.
159
[d.
160
[d. at 21.
152

153

161

Id. at 29.

[d. The President's power as Commander in Chief is derived from the
Constitution. [d. at 25.
163
[d. at 26.
164
[d. at 37.
162
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Constitution. 165 Thus, the President's measures ordering the
accused to be tried before a military tribunal was lawful,l66
In contrast to the facts in Ex Parte Quirin, Congress did
not declared war at the time of Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh's
detention. On September 18, 2001, Congress passed a Joint
Resolution but did not authorize an official declaration of
war.167 The Joint Resolution authorized President Bush to:
[U]se all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international
terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons. 168

In addition to Ex parte Quirin, the government relied on In
re Territo for its authority to detain enemy combatants
irrespective of their United States citizenship. 169 In Territo,
an American citizen was captured in the battlefield and legally
held as a prisoner of war during World War II.l7O The Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that the accused was a United States
citizen, but deemed that citizenship did not shield the prisoner
from the governing laws during a time of war,171 Thus, Territo
provides authority for the government to detain a United
States citizen as a prisoner of war.172
In contrast to the cases the government cites as authority
to detain enemy combatants irrespective of their citizenship,

ld. at 48.
ld.
167 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Congo (2001) (enacted). In contrast to a joint resolution, the
Senate and the House of Representatives expressly authorized an official congressional
declaration of war in a statute. S.J. Res. 119, 77th Cong., 55 Stat. 796 (1941). The last
congressional declaration of war occurred on December 11, 1941. ld. Congress declared
war between the Government of Germany and the United States. ld. In addition, on
the same day, Congress declared war between the Government of Italy and the United
States. S.J.Res. 120, 77 th Cong., 55 Stat 796, 797. In both statutes Congress formally
declared war and authorized the President to employ the entire naval and military
forces to engage in war against the respective governments and to bring the conflict to
a successful termination. ld.
168 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Congo (2001) (enacted).
169
Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283 citing In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142 (9 th Cir. 1946).
170
In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 145·146.
171 ld. at 144.145.
172 ld. at 148.
165

166
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the American Bar Association Task Force on Treatment of
Enemy Combatants, Newman, NYSACDL, and NACDL argue
that the United States Supreme Court case Ex Parte Milligan
is in fact, the controlling precedent for Padilla and Hamdi's
case,173 In Ex Parte Miligan a military commander arrested a
United States citizen in his Indiana residence,174 Upon trial
before a military commission, Milligan was charged with
conspiring against the United States, aiding rebels against the
United States, inciting a rebellion, disloyal practices, and
violating the laws of war,l75
Milligan challenged the
commission's authority to prosecute him, however, the
objection was overruled,l76 The military commission found
Milligan guilty on all the charges and sentenced him to
death,l77 Milligan filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus
with the District Court of Indiana,l78 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari,179
The Court concluded that if President Andrew Johnson's
Order detained a citizen, except as a prisoner of war, the Court
could examme the lawfulness of the government's
imprisonment,l80
The Court found that Milligan was
imprisoned solely under the authority of the President,l81 The
Court understood the Constitution to apply equally to all
citizens in times of peace and war,l82 The Court held that the
military commission did not have jurisdiction to prosecute
Milligan,l83

173
See supra note 9 at 19, 25; Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 7, Padilla v.
Bush (June 19, 2002), available

http://news.findlaw.comlhdocsldocslterrorismlpadillabush61902apet.pdf; Supplemental
Br. Amici Curiae at Part I, Subpart A, B, Padilla v. Bush (Sept. 27, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush92702ambrf.pdf.
174
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6 (1866).
175 [d.
176 [d. at 7.
177

[d.

178

[d.
[d. at 8-9.
[d. at 116.
[d. at 134.
[d. at 120.
[d. at 136.

179
180
181
182
183
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E. THE MILITARY ORDER
President Bush issued a Military Order on November 13,
2001, entitled "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism."184 The President
issued the military order in response to Congress'
authorization to use all necessary force against those
responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks. 185 Although
Congress did not officially declare war, Hamdi and Padilla
remain detained pursuant to Congress' Joint Resolution. 186
The President's Military Order authorized perpetrators acting
alone or in concert, intending to engage or engaging in terrorist
acts against the United States to be tried by a military
commission. 187
The Military Order identifies the United States in a state
of "national security," and provides data on international
terrorists, naming members of al Qaeda as responsible for
carrying out the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 188 The
findings proclaim the attacks created a state of armed conflict,
justifying the use of Armed Forces. 189 In addition, the Military
Order confers exclusive jurisdiction over non-citizens.l 9o The
President, however, may determine from "time to time" who
the exclusive jurisdiction may cover.191
As authority for executing the Military Order, President
Bush cites Senate Joint Resolution 23 "Authorization for Use of
Military Force" and Section 836 of Title 10 of the United States
Code.l 92 Joint Resolution 23 permits the President to use all
necessary and appropriate force. 193 While Section 836 of Title
Mil. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
Id.
186 See supra note 11 at 11.
187 Resp't Mot. Stay Mag. J. May 20, 2002 Order Regarding Access Mem. Supp. at 34, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (May 23, 2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docslterrorismlhadmirum52302gmot.pdf; Resp't Resp.
Mot. Dismiss, Am. Pet. For Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4-6, Padilla v. Bush (Aug. 27,
2002), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush82702grsp.pdf; Mil. Order, 66
Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
188 Mil. Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 at Section 1 (Nov. 13, 2001).
189 Id. at Section l(a).
190 Id. at Section 7(b)(1).
191 Id. at Section 2(a), Section 7(b).
192 See supra note 184.
193 S.J. Res. 23, 107'h Congo (2001) (enacted); See supra note 9 at 6.
184

185
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10 of the United States Code specifically states that the
President may prescribe rules governing military tribunals and
these rules are proper if they do not violate the Constitution.l 94
The Department of Defense was authorized to develop the
policies and procedures for the military tribunals in accordance
with the November 13, 2001 Military Order by President
Bush. 195 On March 21, 2002, the Department of Defense issued
Military Commission Order No.1 (hereinafter, "Order") with
the purpose of ensuring that individuals subject to the military
tribunals receive a full and fair trial. 196 The accused may select
a "detailed defense counsel," which is a military officer or a
civilian attorney.197 The guidelines, however, are unlike the
procedural rules that govern civilian courts. According to the
Order, limited disclosure of protected information from
documents is allowed in the proceedings. 19B Evidence is
admissible if it has reasonable probative value. 199
The
commission may, on its own initiative, summon and hear
witnesses via telephone, audiovisual or any other means it
deems appropriate. 20o
Post-trial procedures consist of an administrative
review. 201 Mter the administrative review, a review panel
examines the trial record. 202
The review panel, in its
discretion, may forward the record of trial to the Secretary of
Defense or return the case to the "Appointed Authority" for
further proceedings only if a "material error of law occurred."203
The commission's charges and sentences including, death or
life in prison, are binding when the President or the Secretary
of Defense make the final decision. 204

10 USCA § 836 (West 2002).
Dept. of Def, Mil. Comm'n Order No.1 (March 21,2002), available
http://www.defenselink.miVnewslMar2002/n03212002_200203213.
194

195

196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at Section 4 (C)(2)(a)(b).
at Section 6(D)(5)(b).
at Section 6(D)(1).
at Section 6(D)(2)(a).
at Section 6(H)(3).
at Section 6(H)(4).
at Section 6 (H)(2)(6).
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F. TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 4001(A)
Congress, through Title 18 of the United States Code
Section 4001(a), prohibited the detention of citizens who are
not officially charged with a crime. 205 However, President
Bush's authority for detaining Padilla and Hamdi comes under
the guise of Congress' Joint Resolution 23 and the President's
This authority arguably allows the
Military Order.206
government to detain citizens indefinitely, without right to
counsel, and incommunicado. 207
The language of the Title 18 Section 4001(a) establishes
limitations on the control and detention of citizens. 208 The
statute reads: "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress."209 In Howe v. Smith, a prisoner held in Vermont,
who was transferred to federal prison, challenged the Attorney
General and the Federal Government's authority to receive and
hold him in a federal penitentiary.210 The Court acknowledged
in a footnote that the language of Section 4001(a) prohibited
detention of "any kind" without congressional authorization.2l1
The Court interpreted Section 4001(a) to mean that persons
protected by the Constitution shall not be detained indefinitely
without congressional authority.
In 1971, Section 4001(a) was amended to prohibit the
detention and control of United States citizens where statutory
basis for incarceration exist. 212 Moreover, the amended statute
repealed the Emergency Detention Act of 1950 (Title II of the
Internal Security Act of 1950), which authorized the
establishment of detention camps and imposed conditions for
their use. 213 The Emergency Detention Act of 1950 was
205 18 USCA § 4001(a) (West 2002); See also Stephen I. Vladeck, A Small Problem of
Precedent: 18 U.S.C. §4001(a) and the Detention of U.S. Citizen "Enemy Combatants,"
112 YALE L.J. 961 (2003) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) in light of the detention of
United States citizens as enemy combatants).
206 See supra note 28 at 3-4; Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 601.
207 Pet'r Reply supra note 42 at 5; Hamdi, 294 F.3d at 601.
208 18 USCA § 4001(a) (West 2002); See supra note 9 at 11.
209
18 USCA § 4001(a) (West 2002); See supra note 9 at 11.
210 Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 479 (1981); See supra note 9 at 11.
Only one
Supreme Court case has made mention of Section 4001(a). Id.
211 Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. at 479.
212 Pub. L No. 92-128; See supra note 9 at 11.
213 Pub. L. No. 92-128; See supra note 9 at 11.
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enacted at the onset of the Korean War.214 The Act established
procedures for dealing with individuals who intended to
commit, or commited acts of sabotage or espionage. 215 The
House Report acknowledged that the statute was subject to
grave challenge, as it required only the intent to commit, or a
reasonable belief that an individual would commit, sabotage or
espionage. 216
G. INTERNATIONAL LAws AND TREATY CONSIDERATIONS

In 1945, the United Nations created the United Nations
Charter.217 The Charter was established to address threats to
international peace. Particularly, the Charter identified basic
humanitarian standards to be followed by all United Nations
members at times of peace and war.218 On December 10, 1948,
the United States signed the United Nations' Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter, "Declaration").219
The Declaration is a pledge to promote fundamental human
rights and dignity and to maintain friendly relationships
between nations. 220 As a member of the Charter and as a
signatory of the Declaration, the United States pledged to
respect human dignity and rights and to recognize
fundamental freedoms. 221 Specifically, the Declaration declares

214

Pub. L. No. 92-128; See supra note 9 at 11, fn 15.

215

Id.

Pub. L. No. 92-128.
Inter-Allied Declaration, June 12, 1941, available
http://www.un.org/aboutunlmilestones.htm. The Inter-Allied Declaration signed on
June 12, 1941, "was the first step towards the establishment of the United Nations."
Id. This Declaration was an agreement "to work together, with other free peoples, both
in war and in peace." Id. On August 14, 1941 the President of the United States,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the United
Kingdom proposed a set of principles intended to maintain international peace and
security. Id. During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, along with the
heads of twenty-six other nations pledged their governments to continue to fight
against Germany, Italy, Japan and associated countries while recognizing basic
humanitarian rights. Id. The Charter was created in 1945 at a United Nations
conference in San Francisco with representatives of 50 countries. Id.
216
217

218

Id.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Office of the U.N.High Commissioner for
Human Rights Geneva, Switzerland, Press Kit (Dec. 10, 1948), available
http://www3.itu.int./udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm.
220 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, available
http://www.un.org/rights/50/decla.htm.
219

221

Id.
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that the preservation of human rights is essential,222 Article 3
of the Declaration preserves individual's rights to life, liberty
and security. 223
The day after the September 11th attacks, the United
Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 1368. 224 The
Resolution sought to reaffIrm the purpose under which the
Charter was created and to address threats to international
peace. 225 The Resolution called upon its Member States to
cooperate with one another to bring to justice those responsible
for the September 11th attacks. 226

H.

GENEVA CONVENTIONS

The term enemy combatant, which Padilla and Hamdi are
designated, is raised in the Third and Fourth Geneva
Conventions. 227 The Conventions govern the treatment of
lawful and unlawful enemy combatants. 228 Further, the
Conventions established the foundation for contemporary
humanitarian law. 229
[d.
[d. at art. 3. Article 3 of the Declaration preserves individual's rights to life,
liberty and security. [d. Article 8 of the Declaration authorizes an effective remedy by
competent national tribunals when fundamental rights by the constitution or laws are
violated. [d. at. art. 8. Article 9 of the Declaration prohibits its members from
subjecting individuals to arbitrary arrests, detentions or exiles. [d. at art. 9. In
addition, Article 28 entitles everyone to a social and international order where the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration are recognized. [d. at. 28.
224 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368, Sept. 12,2001, available
http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/othr/2001l4899.htm.
225 [d.
226 [d.
227 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for
signature Aug. 12, 1949-Feb. 12, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3316 (date of entry into force with
respect to the United States of America: Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva III],
222

223

available
http://www .icrc.org/ihl.nsfi7c4d08d9b287 a42141256739003e636b/6fef854a351 7b7 5ac 12
5641e004age68?OpenDocument; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protections of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949-Feb. 12, 1950, 6
U.S.T. 3516 (date of entry into force with respect to the United States of America: Feb.
2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva IV], available
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsfi7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e636b/6756482d86146898c1
25641e004aa3c5?OpenDocument; See also supra note 9 at 13.
228 HR 5071, 107th Cong., 148 CONGo REC. 4402 (2002); See generally The History of
Humanitarian Law, available http://www.redcross.lv/enlconventions.htm#geneva (last
visited Feb. 18, 2003).
229 See generally The History of Humanitarian Law, available
http://www.redcross.lv/enlconventions.htm#Geneva (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). The
Geneva Conventions were written rules to protect the victims of conflicts; open to all
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On August 12, 1949, sixty-one Nations, including the
United States, signed the Geneva Conventions. 23o
The
Conventions established regulations for persons during an
official declaration of war or armed conflict. 231 The First and
Second Geneva Conventions set out standards for the wounded
and the sick ofthe armed forces in the field and at sea. 232 Each
Convention is premised on the notion that each individual who
finds themselves under the authority of an adverse party is
entitled to respect for his or her life, dignity, personal rights,
and political and religious convictions. 233 Each individual is
protected against acts of violence or reprisal and each is also
entitled to communicate with his or her families and receive
aid. 234
The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions specifically
address prisoners of war and lawful enemy combatants. 235 The
Third Geneva Convention governs the treatment of prisoners of
war.236 Prisoners of war fall into six specific categories. 237
These categories include: members of the Armed Forces of
either side of the conflict; members that are commanded by a
party of the armed conflict or contain fixed distinctive insignia
or carry arms openly or operations comport with the laws of
war; members who proclaim allegiance to armed forces not
recognized by the detaining power; people who accompany the

states and the obligation extends without discrimination to the wounded and sick; and
respect for medical personnel transporting equipment. Id.
230 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949-Feb.
12, 1950, 6 U.S.T. 3217 (date of entry into force with respect to the United States of
America: Feb. 2, 1956) [hereinafter Geneva II], available
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e6 36b/44072487ec4c2131c12
5641e004a9977?OpenDocument.
231
Id.; ABA Task Force on Treatment of Enemy Combatants, Preliminary Report at
13 (Aug. 8, 2002) available at http://www.abanet.orgneadership/enemy_combatants.pdf;
See generally supra note 228.
232 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949-Feb. 12, 1950, 6
U.S.T. 3114 (date of entry into force with respect to the United States of America: Feb.
2, 1956)[hereinafter Geneva I], available
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/7c4d08d9b287a42141256739003e6 36b/fe20c3d903ce27e3c12
5641e004a92f3?OpenDocument; See supra note 230.
233 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
234 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
235 Geneva III and IV, supra note 227.
236 Geneva III, supra note 227, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320,3322.
237 Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol33/iss2/5

28

Ramirez: Unequal Treatment of U.S. Citizens

2003]

UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF U.S. CITIZENS

235

armed forces but are not members; crew members; inhabitants
of non-occupied territory are lawful enemy combatants. 238
The Geneva Conventions provide a minimum standard for
the humane treatment of prisoners of war.239 Distinctions
based on race, religion, sex, wealth or other similar criteria are
prohibited. 240
Further, violence, torture, humiliation,
degrading treatment, sentencing and execution are barred,
absent the safeguards afforded to civilians.241 Additionally,
treatment for the sick and wounded is required. 242
Even those not considered prisoners of war, within the
language of the Third Geneva Convention, are still afforded
protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Fourth
Geneva Convention governs the treatment of civilian persons
in time of war.243 Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
provides protections to people who are not nationals of the
detaining power or adverse power and find themselves in the
conflict.244 A person who is a threat to security is not protected
under the Geneva Conventions. 245 Article 5 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention specifically excludes individuals who are
suspected of, or engage in, hostile activities that affect the state
security from protections prescribed under the Geneva
Conventions. 246 The Fourth Convention, however, clearly
states that no one who is protected should be deprived of the
type of fair trial prescribed by the Geneva Convention. 247
1. MILITARY TRIBUNALS ACT 2002 AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS

While in military custody, Padilla and Hamdi may be
subject to the laws governing military tribunals. Congress,
however, did not authorized the use of military tribunals. 248
On July 9, 2002, California Congressmen, Adam Schiff,
238
239

240
241
242
243
244
245

246
247
248

Id.
Id. at art. 3,6 U.S.T. at 3318, 3320.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Geneva IV, supra note 227.
Geneva IV, supra note 227, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3520.
Geneva IV, supra note 227, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 3522.
Id.
Id.
HR 5071, 107th Cong., 148 CONGo REC. 4402 (2002).
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introduced a bill seeking congressional authorization for
tribunals to prosecute unlawful combatants in the war on
terrorism. 249 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives
Congress the power to create tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court, which includes the power to authorize military
tribunals. 250 These powers not only permit Congress to
authorize military tribunals, but also permit the creation of
rules governing captures and the rules that define and punish
offenses. 251
Schiffs bill, the Military Tribunals Act of 2002, seeks
jurisdiction over non-citizens, non-United States residents,
"unlawful combatants, al-Qaeda members, and those working
in concert with them to attack the United States."252 Under the
bill, the right to due process and humane treatment and the
right to petition for writ of habeas corpus in the military
tribunals are preserved. 253 The bill requires the President to
report to Congress information on the detainees, the basis for
their detention, and a timetable for their detention. 254 The
trial proceedings are open to the public. 255 Evidence, however,
from the Federal Government may be concealed if the evidence
hinders the prosecution, military, or intelligence. 256

II.

DISCUSSION

The events occurring on September 11, 2001, were tragic.
Thousands of innocent lives were lost as the result of terrorist
attacks. Those responsible for the attacks should be punished.
A potential hazard in seeking justice for our nation is the loss
of constitutional safeguards afforded to citizens of the United
States. The cornerstone upon which America was built, the
United States Constitution, must not be jeopardized. America
is premised on the concept of equal protection under the
Constitution. Under the Constitution, United States citizens
are guaranteed a right to due process. Fundamental due
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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process includes the right to counsel, the right to confront and
cross-examine one's accusers, the right to a jury trial and the
right to appeal.
Padilla and Hamdi are citizens detained indefinitely
without being charged with a crime, without right to counsel,
and incommunicado. Allegedly, Padilla and Hamdi possess
information of al Qaeda that could aid the United States in
preventing terrorist attacks. Allegedly, they conspired with al
Qaeda in planning and carrying out acts of terrorism. In
contrast, another citizen, Lindh, was permitted to exercise his
rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.
In Lindh's
sentencing memorandum, he admits to possessing knowledge
and intelligence that could assist the United States in
countering future terrorists acts, the same reasons the
government cites as the basis of Padilla and Hamdi's detention.
257
Lindh, however, was officially charged with crimes and
afforded access to counsel. In a civilian courtroom, Lindh pled
guilty to aiding the Taliban and carrying arms in the
commission of that crime.
The Association of Business Trial Lawyers (hereinafter,
"ABTL") coordinated a panel on December 10, 2002, addressing
the civil liberties and security issues the Padilla, Hamdi, and
Lindh cases presented. 258 Frank Dunham, the Federal Public
Defender representing Hamdi, initially believed his client's
case was analogous to the John Walker Lindh case. 259 In fact,
Dunham planned to borrow the briefs submitted by Lindh's
attorney to the Eastern District of Virginia. 260 Daniel Collins,
Associate Deputy Attorney General for the United States
Department of Justice, representing the government at the
See supra note 146.
Association of Business Trial Lawyers, Can Civil Liberties Be Preserved During
the War on Terrorism? December 10, 2002, in San Francisco, California. The focus of
this panel was to discuss the hundreds of people who have been incarcerated for an
indefinite period of time, without counsel, or judicial review. Specifically, the debate
addressed the balance of civil liberties and security in light of the apparent presence of
sleeper cells in the United States. The moderator of the panel was James J.
Brosnahan, Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP. The speakers included: The Honorable
Michael Daly Hawkins, United States Circuit Judge, 9th Circuit; Steven R. Shapiro,
National Legal Director, ACLU; Daniel Collins, Associate Deputy Attorney General,
United States Department of Justice; Frank Dunham, The Federal Public Defender,
Eastern District of Virginia, representing Yasser Hamdi; Robert Rubin, Legal Director,
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, representing Hady Omar.
259 [d.
260 [d.
257
258
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ABTL, refused to comment on Padilla or Hamdi's case. 261
According to Dean Keane, however, Hamdi and Lindh's case
are factually similar, as they are both United States citizens
detained in Mghanistan. 262 Thus, Padilla's case should present
a stronger argument for allowing him constitutional
protections guaranteed under the Constitution to all citizens.

A.

ENEMY COMBATANTS

The government incorrectly relies on Ex Parte Quirin for
its authority to label citizens as enemy combatants. 263 Ex Parte
Quirin arose during World War II, at a time when Congress
authorized the use of military tribunals for the prosecution of
those accused of violating the laws of war. In contrast to the
facts in Ex Parte Quirin, the Joint Resolution Congress passed
on September 14, 2001, did not amount to an official
congressional declaration of war.
Congress authorized
President Bush to use military force only in response to the
September 11th attacks and in preventing future terrorist acts.
Moreover, the Joint Resolution did not address the labeling of
citizens as enemy combatants as was the case in Ex Parte
Quirin. In fact, nowhere in the Joint Resolution was the term
enemy combatant used. 264
In the present situation, the SDNY rendered its decision
on the Padilla case on December 4, 2002. The SDNY noted
that an official declaration of war was not necessary. In
reaching this conclusion, the SDNY cited the Prize cases as
authority and highlighted the history of armed conflicts in
which Congress did not declare war.265 In fact, the SDNY

Id.
See supra note 10.
263 See discussion supra Part I. D.
264 S.J. Res. 23, 107'h Congo (2001) (enacted).
265 Op. and Order at 50, Padilla V. Bush (Dec. 4, 2002) citing The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), available
http://news.findlaw.comlhdocs/docs/terrorismlpadillabush120402opn.pdf. In the Prize
cases, the Supreme Court recognized that the President has the power to initiate or
declare war. Id. In addition, "war may exist without a declaration on either side." Id.
The SDNY cites the history of armed conflicts that were not officially declared by
Congress but nonetheless amount to a war. Id. at 52. The naval war against France in
the 1970's was not declared but authorized by Congress. Id. The SDNY also lists the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, and the Kosovo bombing
campaign. Id.
261

262
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reasoned that an official congressional declaration of war
seems to be the exception rather than the rule.
However, Steven Shapiro, ACLU panel speaker at the
ABTL and Brosnahan, distinguishes the war on terrorism from
the armed conflicts cited by the SDNY on two grounds. 266
First, the war on terrorism deals with various geographical
10cations.267 The location of the battlefield is constantly
changing. Second, the war on terrorism is not with a nation
state. 268 Thus, there is no foreseeable conclusion like a truce,
treaty, or cease-fire ending this war.269 As such, the current
situation is distinguishable from any prior armed conflict or
official war.270
Arguably, even if the Joint Resolution is similar to a
declaration of war, Ex Parte Quirin is still inapplicable. The
accused in Ex Parte Quirin did not challenge their status as
enemy combatants.
Rather, the accused challenged the
President's authority to prosecute prisoners of war in military
tribunals. Finally, the accused in Ex Parte Quirin were not
held indefinitely without charge, nor were they held
incommunicado without right to counsel. Nor did, Daniel
Collins at the ABTL panel, dispute Frank Dunham's assertion
that the accused in Ex Parte Quirin were not detained
indefinitely, without charge, incommunicado and without right
to counsel.271 Ex Parte Quirin fails to support the government's
current practice of holding citizens indefinitely without charge.
Therefore, Ex Parte Quirin is inapplicable.
In addition, the government's reliance on Territo as
authority to label Padilla an enemy combatant is misplaced. In
Territo, the detainee was captured abroad and labeled a
prisoner of war.272 In contrast, Padilla was captured in the
United States and not labeled a prisoner of war.273 Although
Hamdi and Lindh were captured abroad they were not labeled
prisoners of war. Therefore, Territo is inapplicable.

266
267
266
269
270
271
272
273

See supra note 258.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Territo, 156 F.2d at 146.
See supra note 42 at 6.
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Furthermore, the court in Territo failed to address the
legality of labeling citizens as enemy combatants. Rather,
Territo addressed the government's ability to detain United
States citizens in military custody as prisoners of war during
an official declaration of war. It is indisputable that during an
official declaration of war those captured in the battlefield may
be labeled prisoners of war. Neither Padilla nor Hamdi are
viewed as prisoners of war, but enemy combatants. Lindh, on
the other hand, was viewed as a citizen with Constitutional
protections. Further, at the time Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh
were detained, Congress did not declare war. Therefore,
Territo did not support the government's stance of appointing
citizens enemy combatants, stripped of their constitutional
rights, merely on the government's "say-so."274
Interestingly, Daniel Collins, representing the United
States Department of Justice at the ABTL panel, was unable to
provide a definition or specific criteria used in appointing
enemy combatants. 275 Rather, Collins cited the opinion in Ex
Parte Quirin and the Constitution as conferring the President
with the authority to label individuals enemy combatants. 276
Danger exists without clearer guidelines for classifying citizens
enemy combatants. Shapiro argues the ability to categorize
citizens enemy combatants must not lie solely on the executive
branch. 277 Shapiro stresses the necessity in preserving the
United States' system of checks and balances in the
designation of enemy combatants. 278
B. THE MILITARY ORDER
While the Military Order proclaims that the United States
is in a state of "national security," arguably justifying the use
of the Armed Forces, the Military Order is inapplicable. The
Military Order fails to support the detention of Padilla and
Hamdi because the Military Order does not extend to American
citizens. The Military Order specifically states that individuals
covered by this Order are non-United States citizens. Thus,

277

See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See supra note 258.
[d.
[d.

278

[d.

274

275
276
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citizens like Padilla, Hamdi, and Lindh are excluded from this
order.
Although Section 2 of the Military Order gives the
President discretion from '''time to time" to authorize
perpetrators connected with international terrorism to be tried
before a military commission, the Military Order provides no
guidelines or criteria for determining who may be detained
from "time to time" by the President. 279 The Military Order
fails to define what from "time to time" means. Since Padilla
and Hamdi are in military custody pursuant to the Military
Order, Section 2 of the order is the only clause that may cover
United States citizens.
The vagueness in this clause
demonstrates the need for clearer guidelines to determine who,
in fact, is an enemy combatant.
While President Bush cites the Senate Joint Resolution 23
as authority for implementing the military tribunals, his
reliance is misplaced. The Senate Joint Resolution simply
authorizes the use of military force, not military tribunals. The
use of military force allows the President to use the armed
forces in capturing those who are responsible for the September
11 th attacks and those connected with international terrorism.
In contrast to using military force, the military order permits
individuals to be tried and punished in military tribunals.
The Military Order also cites Section 836 of Title 10 of the
United States Code as authority for implementing the Military
Tribunals. Section 836 authorizes the President to prescribe
rules governing military tribunals that does not violate the
Constitution. 280 The President does not have the power to
authorize the use of military tribunals. Rather, only Congress
holds this power as derived from the Constitution.
A
distinction must be drawn between implementing military
tribunals and prescribing rules governing military tribunals.
Even though Section 836 prohibits the President from
making rules governing military tribunals in violation of the
Constitution, the President did just that. The President
authorized the Military Commission Order, an order
prescribing the policies and procedures for the military

279
280

See supra note 191.
10 USCA § 836 (West 2002).
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tribunals that violate the Constitution. 281 The Order outlines
the procedures for trials by military tribunals against nonUnited States Citizens. 282 The Order implements policy and
procedures for the military commission trials in accordance
with the President's November 13, 2001 Military Order.283 The
Order allows the accused to chose between a "detailed defense
counsel" and a civilian attorney.284
In addition to denying Padilla and Hamdi access to counsel
as authorized under the Order, the Order's guidelines do not
comport with the general principles of evidence and procedures
that govern civilian courts. First, the guidelines permit only
limited
disclosure
of "protected
information"
from
285
documents.
Exactly what information is protected is left up
to the discretion of the Presiding Officer. 286 In addition, the
Presiding Officer or the Appointed Authority may close the
proceedings because of protected information. 287 They may
even exclude the accused and his or her counsel from the
proceedings.288
Second, under the Order any evidence is admissible that
has probative value to a reasonable person. 289 This standard
supplants the Federal Rules of Evidence, which govern civilian
courts, and allow only relevant evidence. 29o In civilian courts,
the judge is permitted to exclude relevant evidence, if the
danger outweighs the probative value. 291 Essentially, the
Order may allow every piece of evidence against the accused to
be considered, while in a civilian courtroom the same evidence
may be excluded. Arguably, without the limitations of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, irrelevant facts and proof may be
considered.
Third, the Order allows the Commission, on its own
initiative, to summon and hear witnesses via telephone,

281

282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289

290
291

Id.; Mil. Order 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
Mil. Order 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 at Section 1 (Nov. 13, 2001).
Id.
See supra note 195 at Section 4(C).
Id. at Section 6(D)(5).
Id. at Section 6(D)(1).
Id. at Sections 6(D)(5)(c) and 6(B)(3).
Id. at Section 6(B)(3).
Id. at Section 6(D)(1).
FED. R. EVID. 401.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
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audiovisual or any other means. 292 In civilian courts, judges
are allowed to call witnesses. 293 A witness's testimony via
telephone, audiovisual or other means, however, must be
deemed unavailable by the court as a requisite to
admissibility.294
Lastly, the Order does not permit an independent judicial
review. 295
The reVIew process consists only of an
administrative review conducted by an "Appointed
Authority."296 The "Appointed Authority" may be the Secretary
of Defense or a designee. 297 The Order does not explain who
the "Appointed Authority" or designee might be. Mter the
administrative evaluation, panels consisting of three Military
Officers review the record of the trial. 298 The review panel may
either forward the record of trial to the Secretary of Defense or
return the case to the "Appointed Authority" for further
proceedings but only if a "material error of law occurred."299
The final decision-maker, however, is the President or the
Secretary of State. 300 Under this scheme, the President acts
both as prosecutor and judge. He designates citizens as enemy
combatants and makes the final decision on appeal. Therefore,
there is no guarantee of fundamental fairness. The purpose
behind the implementation of the Military Commission Order
is to ensure a full and fair trial before a military commission.
The procedures, however, prescribed in the Order conflict with
the purpose behind its implementation.
The Order's
See supra note 195 at Section 6(A)(5).
FED. R. EVID. 614.
294
See generally FED. R. EVID. 801, 802, 803. In Brumley v. Wingard, 269 F.3d 629
(2001), the petitioner was convicted in state court for "complicity to commit aggravated
murder with two death penalty specifications and kidnapping." Id. at 633. The
petitioner argued the state court erroneously allowed a videotape of an incarcerated
witness without first finding the individual unavailable. Id. at 637. The court
reasoned in some cases the state's compelling interest such as, protecting child abuse
survivors, outweighs the defendant's right to confrontation. Id. at 644. Generally the
court, however, must find the witness unavailable. Id. Nonetheless, the court held the
admission of the videotape was not harmless error and affirmed the lower court's
decision. Id. at 644-645, 647. See also Edward K. Esping, Stephanie A. Giggetts,
Christine M. Gimeno, Rachel M. Kane, & Susan L. Thomas, Testimony by ClosedCircuit Television or Videotape, 25 Ohio Jur. 3d Crim Law § 468 (Nov. 2002).
296 See supra note 195 at Section 6(H).
296 Id. at Section 6(H)(3).
297 Id.
298 Id. at Section 6(H)(4).
299 Id.
300 Id. at Section 6(H)(6).
292
293
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procedures conflict with a full and fair trial under the
Constitution.
C. TITLE 18 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE SECTION 4001(A)
That the laws of civilian courts are inapplicable to military
court may, in some respects, explain the conflict between
congressional legislature and the government's action. 30l
Whatever the explanation may be, it is essential that Padilla
and Hamdi, as United States citizens, be given the same
constitutional safeguards, as Lindh. 302
The SDNY did not explicitly rule that Section 4001(a) was
inapplicable to Padilla's case. 303 Section 4001(a) prohibits the
detention of any person protected by the Constitution without
congressional authority. Padilla and Hamdi are not been
officially charged with crimes, nor has Congress authorized
their detention.
The executive branch has unilaterally
designated Padilla and Hamdi enemy combatants without
congressional authority. Thus, the detention of Padilla and
Hamdi violates Section 4001(a).304
Additionally, when Title 18 of the United States Code
Section 4001(a) was amended in 1971, the House Report noted
that the statute was subject to severe challenge because it only
required reasonable grounds for believing someone intended to
engage, or engaged in, espionage or sabotage. 305 The belief that
a person in the future could engage in espionage or sabotage
allowed the government to preserve information essential to
the defense of an accused. 30G Similarly, President Bush's
November 13, 2001 Military Order raises similar concerns.
The Military Order allows an individual who intends to
undertake future terrorist attacks against the United States to
be tried before military commissions. Similar to the 1971
amendment to Title 18 Section 4001, the Military Order only
requires the intent of an individual to engage in future

301
302
303
304
305
306

Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 137.
See supra note 146 at 11; Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120.
See supra note 68 at 67-74.
See supra note 205, 208.
Puh.L. No. 92-128; See supra note 9 at 11, fn 15.
Id.
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terrorist attacks. Therefore, history dictates that this Military
Order should be subject to "grave challenge."307
D. INTERNATIONAL LAws AND TREATY CONSIDERATIONS

The United Nations Charter was created to fight all
threats to international peace. Combating all threats to
international peace is important for the United States as well
as other signatory nations. Clearly, those responsible for the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks should be punished.
Punishing individuals, however, who threaten international
peace should not permit the government to label certain
citizens enemy combatants and strip them of their
constitutional rights for an indefinite period of time. Punishing
individuals who threaten international peace should not mean
international laws, which the United States has pledged to
abide by, can be ignored. As a member of the Charter,
international laws and treaties bind the United States.
Under the Declaration, every individual is protected
against arbitrary arrests and detentions.
Arguably, the
government's designation of United States citizens Padilla,
Hamdi, and Lindh as enemy combatants seems inconsistent
and arbitrary. Since the United States government's actions
may conflict with the Declaration, an international treaty, a
close look at all applicable laws is essential.
In addition, the Declaration preserves an individual's right
to life and liberty. The label enemy combatant allows the
government to detain citizens incommunicado and without a
right to counsel. Padilla and Hamdi are not allowed to
communicate with family or friends.
Further, they are
detained without right to counsel. Such circumstances may
violate the United Nations treaty. As United States citizens,
Padilla and Hamdi are guaranteed rights under international
United Nations agreements.

307

[d.
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E. GENEVA CONVENTIONS

Protections prescribed by the Geneva Conventions to
protect victims of conflicts should extend to include Padilla and
Hamdi. 308 The Conventions provide a minimum standard for
humane treatment, entitling every person to dignity and
respect for one's life. Moreover, the Conventions make a clear
distinction between the protections afforded to lawful enemy
combatants, protected prisoners of war, and unlawful enemy
combatants, unprotected prisoners of war. An unlawful enemy
combatant is one who is suspected of engaging, or has engaged,
in hostile activities that threaten the security of the state.
Padilla and Hamdi could conceivably fit under the following
categories, as defined in the Third Geneva Convention,
guaranteeing them certain protections: members of the Armed
Forces of either side of the armed conflict, members that are
commanded by a party to the conflict or operations comport
with the laws of war, loyal members of the armed forces but
who are not recognized by the detaining power, and crew
members.309
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Hamdi could be
categorized as a lawful combatant since he was captured in
Mghanistan. Although Padilla was captured in the United
States the Fourth Geneva Convention makes clear that every
person is entitled to humane treatment. 310 Therefore, Padilla
and Hamdi should be given a hearing prescribed by the
Conventions to determine whether they are entitled to the
status of prisoner of war.3l1
F. MILITARY TRIBUNALS ACT 2002 AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS

As of the date of this writing, no action has been taken by
Congress to implement the Military Tribunals Act. The Act
seeks to establish the jurisdiction of military tribunals "over
non-U.S. residents, unlawful combatants, al-Qaeda members
and those working in concert with them to attack the United
308
309

310
311

See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
Geneva IV supra note 227.
See supra note 9 at 24.
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States."312 The military tribunal decisions are subject to
challenge because Congress did not specifically authorized the
use of military tribunals.
Even if this Act is passed, it is inapplicable to United
States citizens like Padilla, Hamdi or Lindh. The Act is
specifically geared towards non -citizens, such as those detained
at Guantanamo base. Our government should impose a set
standard of guidelines for labeling citizens enemy combatants.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
To address the concern that the government is
inconsistently labeling citizens enemy combatants, while others
in similar situations are afforded the rights guaranteed to
criminal defendants in a civilian courtroom, specific
recommendations are offered. In civilian courts, criminal
defendants are subject to a preliminary proceeding to
determine if probable cause exists for the criminal charges.
Similarly, citizens identified as enemy combatant should be
subject to a preliminary proceeding.
The preliminary
proceeding should be used to determine if the status is lawful,
since enemy combatants, per the government, may be detained
indefinitely for the duration of the conflict. Conceivably, the
duration of the conflict against international terrorism may
never end.
Evidence that the individual is an enemy combatant
connected to international terrorism should be submitted to the
United States District Court for review. The government's
burden should be analogous to criminal proceedings. The
District Court should review the status of an enemy combatant
in camera. Allowing the court to review the necessary
information in camera will protect information from leaking
out to the public and possible accomplices of the perpetrator.
This process will preserve the confidentiality of the
government's sources of information. Additionally, the District
Court should examine whether the designation of enemy
combatant violates treaties of international law.
The alleged enemy combatant should be given access to
counsel in order to ensure procedural and substantive
312

HR 5071, 107th Cong., 148 CONGo REC. 4402 (2002).
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constitutional safeguards guaranteed to all citizens in civilian
courts. Each enemy combatant should have the choice between
a court appointed defense counselor privately retained counsel.
Each enemy combatant should also be permitted to
communicate freely with his or her counsel while in custody.
Additionally, the enemy combatant should be allowed to
communicate with his family and friends. Limitations should
be effected to ensure information aiding or leading to
international terrorism is prevented.
In addition, each
conversation and visit should be monitored and supervised
except with his or her counsel. If conversations in a language
other than English occur, at the expense of the accused, a
translator certified by the court should translate the
conversation into English for the government. In the event
that the accused cannot afford a translator, one should be
provided.
Even after a review by the district court deeming the
individual an enemy combatant, a hearing prescribed by the
Geneva Conventions should be allowed. The hearing will
determine if the status of a prisoner of war is appropriate.
Implementing procedures similar to those in criminal
proceedings will ensure that the government's standards for
labeling citizens enemy combatant is not arbitrarily imposed.

IV. CONCLUSION
Requiring a basic level of due process for United States
citizens counterbalances any impediment resulting from the
implementation of procedures to non-selectively designated
enemy combatant. While the government's job may become
more difficult by requiring concrete evidence of enemy
combatant status, this is not a permissible reason to erode
constitutional safeguards. Despite the challenges presented by
preserving the Constitution, its historical significance and
benefits are indispensable and deserving of preservation.
To fully comply with the Constitution, criminal defendants
must have access to counsel. Policies that obstruct a citizen's
right to counsel, especially when the death penalty and life
sentences are implicated, threaten the fundamental principles
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on which this country is based. Enemy combatants should be
treated similarly to criminal defendants because the
punishment is equally grave. Further, United States citizens
under the law should be treated equally in crimes and
punishment. The government's standards of labeling selected
citizens as enemy combatants should be revised to adequately
reflect the central importance of preserving constitutional
protections.
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